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EXPERT TESTIMONY
The practice of admitting the testimony of experts is of
very ancient origin. The Roman law provided that Iersons"ar-
tisperiti" might be summoned by the judge in order that he
might inform himself as to matters embraced by the various
trades and professions in their several specialities.
L. 8, Par. 1. X. 1.- L. 3, Cod. fin. Reg: III. 39
Edeman, 243.
Many of the nations of Con tinental Europe at an early
date introduced into their laws provisions for admitting the
testimony of the expert. It was a requirerrent of the Crimi-
nal Code of Charles V., which was drawn up at Ratisbon in
1532, that medical expert testimony should be taken wherever
death was supposed to have occurred through violence. Francis
I., after the publication of the Caroline Code, decreed that
both physicians and surgeons should be legally required to act
in a medico-legal capuacit y. Henry IV., (1606) provided that
his Chief Physician should be empowered-to appoint two surgeos
in every city or important town, whose duty it should be to
examine and report upon all wcunded or murdered men, ard Louis
XIV. decreed that physicians must always be present with sur-
geons at the examination of dead bodies.
Foder~e's Traite" de M~ d. Leg. Vol. I.
About the first book written upon the subje ct was a
treatise by a Gerrran doctor, Johannes Bohn, published about
1698, and in 1704 the same author produced a more voluminous
wcrk, a book of rules for the guidance of medical experts in
courts of law. A very early English record shows, in a case
of mayhem, a demand that the court examine the wound to de-
cide as -o whether there had been a maiming or not, and, as
the court was unable to reach a decision, a writ was issued
to the Sheriff to cause "medicos, chirugicus de melioribus ad
informarilum dominum regum et curiam venire" . The Year Books
also show several cases into which expert testimony was, of
necessity, introduced.
9 Hen. VII., 16; 7 Hen. VI., l.
Expert testimony may then be well said to have grown up
with the common law, or, at least, to have become a recogni-
zed part of it at a very early date.
As to the wisdom of admitting the testimony of the expert
there is a wide divergence of opinion. The mind looks with a
natural suspicion upon the witness whose testimony is bought
an1 paid for, added, to this, but more rar ticularly, withl in
the domain of redicine, we have had, of late, all too frequent
ly, the spectacle of two experts upon the witness stand, both
3of equally exalted reputation, at a total variance of opinion
as to the subject upon which they were called upcn to testify.
Mr. Wharton (I. Wharton, Ev. , Par. 454, note 2) quoting from
the New York Evening Post, presents the following excellent
example of this lamentable condition of affairs:
"A striking instance of an unexpected source of eeror in sciel
tific investigation was witnessed in the last case tried by
Mr. Justice Jones in the Superior Court in this City (New
York), being the case in which the house of J. and J. Coleman
established their right to a bull's head as their trade-mark
on mustard. Professor X., one of the most celebrated anylit-
ical chemists of New York, a witness called by the defendant,
had alleged, as the result of his experiments, that mustard
contained over eleven percent of starch.
Two other anxl4tical chemists, one of them Professor
Chandler of Columbia College alleged that mustard contained no
starch. The evidence was in this conflicting condition when
both parties rested and the case was adjourned until the next
mornling for argument. In the meantime Professor' X. applied
to the counsel of the defendant to move to so far open the
case as to allow him to vindicate by actual experiment in open
court, the correctness of his statement as to the existence of
4starch in mustard. The motion was made and granted and on
the fifth of December last, the court room presented the ap-
pearance of a chemical labratory. The professor, with his as-
sistants prepared mustard for experiment in open court by poug&
ing the seed in a mortar- He placed the crushed seed in dis-
tilled water and boiled the mixture over a spirit-lamp. He
then threw some of the solution on sheets of filtering paper,
and applied his test and exhibited the characteristic blue io-
dine of starch. The experiment was varied in many way s with
the same result and at the end of the testimony many sheets
of paper were uhus colored. The demonstration seemed per-
feet. On Professor Chandler being called to the stand, he
made experiments which, in his view demonstrated that starch
did not exist in nmustard and stated that he was not satisfied
with the experiments that had been made by the defendantt's
witness.
"Why'.-said the defendart's counsel,-.are not you satis-
fied with the reaction for starch exhibited by Dr. X. on a
dozen or more sheets of filtering paper?
1'1 am not certain to begin with.-- said Prof. Chandler --- that
the paper would not have produced that reaction without the
'l
must ar d.
Whereupon the counsel handed to the witness some of the clean
5paper, and asked him to apply the test h imselif. He did so,
and the result was a deep blue, thus showing the illusory na-
ture of the prior tests and that, tle experiment was entirely
worthless as a proof that starch was contained in mustard".
In the Guiteau tridl occurs another example of 1rhe inac-
cunacy of this kind of testimony, on page 1648 of the trial
report we find the following:
Q. (By Mr. Scoville for the defence) "But insanity does
necessarily mean disease of the brain?'
Ans. (By Dr. Gray a medical expert ), "Insanity necessa-
rily means that the/i'e is a ccnjunction mr combination of dis-
ease of the brain with mental disturbance."
On Page 1673 of the same report we find -
Q. (By Mr. Scoville) "The disease itself, I understand
you to say, is never inherited?'
Ans. (By Dr. Gray) "Never. Insanity is never inherited
as a disease,."
And on pp. 1676, 1677 we find Mr. Scoville introducing five
statistical reports of cases of hereditary transmission of-mrtu:
L G6I drawn up by Dr. Gray as n'edica1 superintendent of the
New York Lunatic asylum, for the years l879, 8O,'84,'S,'g8. Such
an instance of inaccuracy surely needs no furtIher comment.
6The somewhat re cent trial of Dr. Buchanan in New York,
for murder, presented another example of this kind of unexpectr
ed error in expert testimony. During the cross-examination
Of a medical expert, called by the state, one of the counsel
for the defence tendered the witness a yellowish mas , appar-
ently a wax brain, requesting him to illustrate upon it the
mtter he was testifying to. The expert looked at it for a
moment, then returned it to the counsel, scornfully terming it
a mere caricature of the brain. This"caricature" was subse-
quently proved, by the testimony of the gentleman who had pre.-
pared to be a "human" brain preserved by the Zinc-Chloride
method.
These examples present very rerarkable instances of the
fallacy of expert testimony, but there is still another view
of the case. Is not the legal profession demanding an infal-
libility of opinion, an accuracy of statement, from experts
representing the trades anil professions, which it does not
possess itself? What a disagreement there seems to be among
members of the legal profession on many points of law. Even
in the totally unbiased opinions of our judges we find wide
disagreement. Let us examine, as an example, the New York
rule as to what constitutes the test of the requisite capacity
to make a will. In the case of Delafield v. Parish (25 Nq.Y.9)
7we f ind the rule laid down that if a man be "compos 
ment i s
he can make any will, however complicated; if not, he can make
no will however simple; ani the maindi question seems to be "
what state of mind constitutes "compos mentis". Then, in
Stewart v. Lispenard, (26 Wend. 255), we find it decided that
the capacity to make the particular will in question, is the
true test; and although this case is of earlier date than
that in 25 N. Y. 9 we find in the case of VanGuysling v. Van
Kuren (35 N. Y. 70), that the court completely ignored Dela-
field v. Parish to follow it. Sinse the case of Stewart v.
Lispenard there have been various minor court decisions in
New York, arny of them at a total variance of opinion as to
what was held in Delafield v. Parish. Surely this 1's as wide
a divergence of opinion as ever existed between two medical
exper ts.
It is clear that we cannot do without the testimony of
the expert. In 7 Rep. p. 19, we find it laid down that "Om-
nes prudentes illa admitere solent quae probantur iis qui in
arte sua bene versati sunt." The whole question hinges not
upon the admission of the testimony of the expert but upon his
capciy ad apailto. , e cannot expect our judges and ju-
ries to be storehouses of scientific knowledge, abolish expert
8testimony conpletely and the cases involving 
questions of a
scientific or artistic nature, if ever rescued from 
the cha-
os into which they must of necessity sink, will all too fre-
quently be decided in a manner which the testihony of the ix-
pert witness, if admitted, would have rendered impossible.
That the sciences, and more particulaily that of medecine, are
by no means thoroughly developed, will account for much of the
contradictory testimony of experts, then, if we carry in mind
the fact that such testimony is, after all, only "opinion" the
testimony of experts may be received in'suitable cases and
will prove of no little value to both court and jury.
I dismiss, as utterly untenable, the opinion that expert
testimony is given as paid for, or in other words, may be pur-
chased- I do not believe that an expert can be found who will
prostitute the science to which he has devoted himself, the
reputation he may possess among men of his own genus, for the
sum of money, necessarily small, which he may receive as re-
muneration for his services in a court of law.
I believe the blame for many of the apparent contradic-
tions in the testimony of experts may be fastened upon the
members of the legal profession whith whoni they are brought
in contact during the progress of the trial. The incompe-
tency of examining c ounsel all two frequently detracts from,
9rather than enhances, the value ofan expert's testimony. I
quote, as an example, a question recently put to an electrical
expert in an action in one of the lower courts of New York.
Q. "What would be the effect upon a man if he touched a wire
through which a current of electricity, sufficient to drive a
heavy car up a steep hill, was flowing"*
The exact point to be ascertained was- would such a current
be sufficiently powerful to cause a man, mounted upon a tele-
graph-pole to lose his balance? But fearful, no doubt, lest
the question, in such form as would render it intelligible to
the witness, should prove a boomerang, the examiner carefully
veiled it and it might as well have been omitted.
This one, of rrany instances,*ll illustrate the fact that,
if much of the testimony of an expert be ambiguous and appar-
ently contradictory, he is not always the sole person to be
blamed. If the expert be examined by one of his own profess-
ion, who, at the same time is a member of the legal profession,
as was the case in the recent tri al of Dr. Buchanan, for mur-
der, in New York City, a decidedly better result will he ob-
tained, though such a seheme is unfortunately not feasible
in many instances. I amj however, of the opinion that the
one side may, in cases where same doubt exists as to the sci-
10
entifically phenomena involved, obtained, by skillful questiOn
ing, from the testimony of on expert as the other. It is not
then a question as to whether we shall admit expert testimony
but what is the v>-lue of expert testimony in each particular
case. This of course varies largely in different cases. It
is of first importnnce that the facts upon which an expert's
opinion is based, be satisfactorily established. It is next
necessary that the integrity and skill of the witness be knowR
Then, where the expert states precise facts in science, as as-
certained and settled, or states the ncessary and invariable
conclusion which results from the facts before him; his opin-
ion is entitled to great weight. Where he gives only the
probable inference from the facts stated his opinion is of les
impobtance. Where the opinion is speculative, theoretical,
and states only the belief' of -Lhe witness, while some other o-
pinion is equally zonsistent with the facts in the case, i. i;
entitled to but little weight.
Gay v. Union Mut Life Ins. Co. (9 Bl9tch. 143)
It is a fact, mtch to be regretted, that so many of the opin-
ions rendered recently b experts, in courts of' law, should
have been of this latter nature.
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WHO IS AN EXPERT?
Here again we face a multiplicity of definitions snd a
decided variance of opinion. Many of the definitions that
have been attempted are of such D meager nature as to be prac-
tically worthless; I have in mind one rendered by a western
court in these few words, "An experYot is a skillful person"
the wot'-hlessness of which is self-evident.
In the consideration cf the question it is obviously im-
possible to frame a definition that will be at once consise
and clear and at the same time applicable to every situation
that may arise. The rule for the admission of experts as -
witnesses places the question of qualification, to a great ex-
tent at the discretion of the presiding judge.
Howard v. City of Providence, (6 R. 1. 516.
He my even, if he regard it as necessary, make a prelim-
inary examination of the witness seeking to qualify as an ex-
pert. This rule, which at first sight would seem to dermxi
an almost universal knowledge on the part of the court, is
fortified by the fact that the witness is subjected., while on
the stand, to an examiation by counsel that will generally
12
establish or negative his qualifications as an ex-e-rt. The
question as to who is an expert can perhaps be best answered
by quoting freely from the case of Jors v. Tucker,(41 N. H.
546). Mr. Justice Doe, in that case, says -"When the wit-
ness is offered as an expert, three quostions necessarily a-
rise:- 1. Is the subject coneerning which he is to testify,
one upon which the opinion of an expert c.n be received?
2. What arethe qualifications necessary to entitle a witness
to testify as an expert? -3. Has the witness these qualift
cations. Exie rts may still -7ive their opinions upon ques-
tions of science, skill, or trade, or others of the like kind,
or when the subject matter of inquiry is such that inexperien-
ced persons are unlikely to prove c-pable of forming a correct
judgmnent upon it without such or when it so far par-
takes of the nature of a science as to require a course of pre
vious habit, or study, in order to the attainment of the knowl
edge of it; and the opinions of experts are not admissible,
when the inquiry is into a subject ratter the nature of which
is not such as to require any peculiar habits or study, in or-
der to qualify a man to understand it.--
I. Greenl. Ev. Sec. 440.-- 1 Smith L. C. 2S6.
Rochester v. Chester, 3 N. H. 349.
Peterborough v. Jaffray, 6 U. H. 462.
Marshall v. Ins. Co., 27 KJ. Hi. 157.
Beard v. Kirk, 11 K . Hf. 397
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upon subtects of 7eneral knowl'edge which are understood by men
in general, and which a jury are presumed to be familiar with,
witnesses must testify as to facts -lone, and the testimony
of witnesses is experts merely is not admissible"
Concord R. . Co v. Greely, 23 ii. H. 237 - 243,.
Experts have been described as "Men of science",
Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157.
"Pers8ns professionally acquainted with science or practice"
Strickland on Evidence, 408.
"Conversant with the subject matter"
Best's Prin. of Ev., Sec. 346.
"Perosns of Skill"
Rochester v. Chester, 3 N. H. 349 - 365.
"Possessed of some particular science or skill respecting the
matter in question"
Beard v. Kirk, 11 N. H. 397.
An expert must have ade the subject on which he gives
his opinion a matter of rarticular study, ractise or observa-
tion and he must have particylar and special knowledge upon
the subje ct.
The rules detarmining the subjects upon which experts nay
testify and the r. ules prescribing the qualifications of ex-
14
perts, are natters of la; but whtehbr a witness, offered 
as
an expert, has those qualifications, is a question of fact to
be decided by the court at the trial. The various disquali-
fications whfich render a p rson incompetent to be sworn and to
give any testimony, are fixed by law, but whether the disabil
ties exist in a particular case is a question of fact. And
whether a disability is such thai a person cannot testify at
all or only such that he cannot testify as an expert, the ex-
istence o1 the disability is equally a matter of fact, most
conveniently and satisfactorily determined at the trial. That
an expert must have special ar le culier knowledge or skill
is as definite a rule as that the search for a subscribing
witness must be diligent and thorough; and whether a witness h
has special and peculiar knowledge, is as much a question of
fact as the question whether the search for the witness has
been diligent and thorough.
Many are the definitiona and explanations which have been
attempted. Bell, in his work on expert testimony, says
"The legal signification of "expert' (ex pertus) corresponds
strictly with the ordinary acceptation of the noerm, namely,
'one who has skill, exer ience, or peculiar knowledge on cer-
tamn subjects of inquiry in science, art, trade and the like":
Bell on Exrert Testimony, p. 11.
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In Best on Evidence (p. 499 Charhberl. Ed. ) this defini-
tion is to be found-"On questions of science, skill, trade
add the like, persons conversant with the subject natter
called by foreign jurists 'experts', an expression now natur-
alized among ms-are permitted to give their opinions in ev-
idence. This rests on the maxim 'cuilibet in sua arte perito
est credendum".
"Coke on Littleton" 125 a.
The application of these rules is of continual occurrence
Medical men are frequently called upon to explain the cause of
death, or the condition of a person's mind. Scientific men,
to explain natural phenomena. Lawyers, to explain laws and
customs within the province of their profession. It is not
necessary that the person offered as an expert should have
combined study with practice, or vice versa, in order to be
qualified to give testimony as an expert.
Taylor v. Railway, 48 N. H. 304.
Mason v. Fuller, 45 Vt. 29.
But observation without either study or practise will nev
er be sufficient.
Perkins v. Stickney, 132 Mass. 217.
Clark v. Bruce, 12 Hun, 271.
Nor is it at all necessary that he should at present be engag-
16
ed in the practise of the art., trade.or profession as to whi
which he is called to testify. When the testimony of an ex-
pert becomes necessary, the only requirements are that the wii
nOss offerted as such should be particularly skilled in the
science, art , trade or profession involved in the subject up-
on which he is called to testify. This skill or knowledge
m-ay be acquired in any manner whatsoever provided the witness
posess the requisite degree of skill, information or knowledge
to entitle his opinion to the credence accorded to that of an
expert.
Emerson v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 6 Allen 146.
Caleb v. State, 39 Miss. 721.
Fairchild v. Bagcom, 35 Vt. 398.
The rule is. or ought to be, perfectly clear in the
first place, the subject should be one requiring the services
of an expert. Secondly, the.expert should be qualified and
particularly inforrred, either by practise or special study,
as to the subject upon which he is to testify-- it is no more
the province of the practising physician, with an experience o
6f one case, to state as an expert opinion that the result of
a chemical test, to which certain portions of a dead body have
been subjected, evidences the presence of a minute quanitity
of morphia rather than the existence of ptonmines and leuko-
17
maines; than it is within the sphere of a chemist to 
prove
that a person is afflicted with nystagmus.- And lastly, 
when
rendering his testimony, it is never the privilege of an ex-
pert to assun the functions of a jury; a method has grown
up, which well nigh evades ths rule- the hypothetical ques-
tion- which will be referrred to at more length later.
WHEN IS EXPERT TESTIMONY ADMISSIBLE?
0-
The rule as to this nay be stated as follows -- When the
controversy, from its nature, necessarily involves questions
of a scientific nature which, without the opinions of witness-
es, skilled in the science, professicn, trade or art in ques-
tion, can not be presented to a jury in such form as to ena-
ble them to decide the question involved with the requisite
degree of knowledge or judgrrent the testimony of experts may
be introduced.
Van Zandt V. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 169.
Kenrdy v. People, 39 N. Y. 255 - 257.
Shelton v. State, 34 Tex. 663.
The admissibility of the testimony of the expert ira: be
said to be provided for in almost every civilized country,
though the niethod of receiving it may vary somnewhat.
18
In Scotland the report of the meLdical man engaged in a
case forms a part of the4 preliminary investigation, oriprecog-
nitionas it is called, before the Procurator-Fiscal. In
England, as in the United States, the testimony is all receiv-
ed at the trial. On the Continent, and more esp cially in
France and Germany, experts, when medical nen, are chosen from
a slpecial class and act singly or in conjunction with each
other. In these cases, instead of being subjected to a viva
voce examination at either the Precognition or the trial, the
expert is presented, at te preliminary investigation , with
a series of" written questions together with the written depo-
sitions of the witnesses and of the accused, and from the stuy
of these he is required to render, in writing, his opinion in
the case, adding at length the reason upon which such opinion
is based. This system, as I have beforestated, applies
more particularly to the medical expe rt and is not without its
advantages. Were it possible to secure a staff of recognized
experts in each state, it would rreatly enhance the value of
expert testimony; as it stands today, in this c cuntry, the tea
timony of the expert, the "paid wins" is looked upon with
pronounced disfavor by the public, while the general sentiment
of the legal profession may be gathered from the following ex-
19
cerpt from Mr. Wharton's work on evidence (Vol. I. Par- 454)
"Few specialties are so small as not to be torn by factions;
and often, the smaller the specialty, the more inflaming ard
bitter and distorting are the animosities by which these fac-
tions are possessed. Peculiarly is this the case in mtters
physicological, in which there is no hypothesis so monstrous
that an expert cannot be f ound to swear to it on the stnad and
defend it with vehemence when off the stand. 'Nihl tam ab-
surde dice potest, quod non dicatur ab alioquo philosophoruht'
°
To return, however, to this question as to when exe rt
testimony is admissible. There is but little to be added,
by way of expl-3nat ion, to the definition before given. It is
a fixed and certain rule that an expert rray not give an opin-
ion as to common every day facts that lie within the knowl-
edge of every man.
I Phillips Ev. 780.
II. Taylor's Evidence, 1250
Nor may he give an opinion of law.
Carrington et al v. Burden, 15 How. 270
Winans v. 14. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 21 How. 88.
The Stearine Kaarsen Fabrick Gonda Co. v. Heintzman,
17 C. B. N. . 56.
SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY IN THE EXAMINATION OF
WRITTEN DOCUMENT S
Illustrated by an Examiation of t1-e "Whittaker Case".
This field is one in which the testimony of the expert
has proved of particllar value. In questions as to a testa-
tor's signature, in the discoveries of the authors of anony-
mous letters, in cases of forgerieFs, in every case where there
has been a dispute as to the authenticity of hand-writing, the
testimony of the expert has always been of particular service.
The rule as to the admission of this kind of testimony is
extremely clear and simple. Where the authenticity bf hand-
writing is in question, the testimony ol an expert upon the
subject is admissible. The following rmy be stated to be the
rules as to the value of testimony with regard to manuscripts,
signatures, etc.
I. 1Te best evidence, as to the writer of the manuscript,
is the evidence of one who has seen him write.
II. Second in value is the evidence of one who has car-
ried on a correspondence with the person whose writing is in
dispute.
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III. The third in value is that obtained by the compari-
son of hand-writings, the testimony of the caligraphic expe.t.
Let me , before proceeding farther in the discussion of
this field of expert evidence, quote somewhat at length, from
an anonymous article, thai pppeared in 2 Crim. Law Mag. 139.
"That a man's hand-writing is anything but the product of his
will is a proposition familiar enough. Thus, a man may will
or wish to write a round copper-.plate hand, or an agular for-
eign hand, without being, able to dc it. If a man could regu-
late his penmanship by his will, of course there would be the
end of caligraphic experts. The forgery---which now and then
is once successful-would travel on indefinitely, deceiving
the very elect, instead, as the rile is, of depending for its
success- if success it have at all -upon a single slip of
the paying teller. But that A- cannot, imitate as skillfully
as he will, divest himself of his own natural charecteristic,
has now come to be demonstrated. The accomplished expe'rt has
only to study his man. The hand of a writer is beyond the
power of that writer's will or that writer's eye. The will is
absorbed by the subject matter- The eye latches the paper,
keeps the hand running in lines, prevents the line gliding ov-
er the edge etc. etc. But once in motion the hand will ac-
22
quire the rervous motion, which, as surely as it moves at all
writes dovm itself, its very self and no other. An effott to
make a single letter would be ,n unusual movement, perhaps,
for any but a writing master, but when rapidly advancing from
letter to letter and from word to word, lifting itself slight
ly every instant to skip the place between the words, the hand
will measure off from parts of letters to the next succeeding
part and from one word to another until it is taken up,a Sott
of gauge, running like a machine, and, whether regular or unt
formly irregular, this gauge will be not the least reliable
feature Qf the che rcteris-.ic."
Having shown by this excerpt that the work of caligraph-
ic experts rests upon a scientific basis and .-not upon mare
acquired skill of the eye and has, moreoVer, achieved two pro-
nounced an eminence to be slightly assailed; let -s next con-
sider one of the leading cases upon the subject.
THE WHTTTAKER CASE.
Probably no better case could be selected to illustrate
the field of the caligraphic expert's testimony than this much
disputed Cause C~lbbre'.
In the class that entered the United States Military
23
Academy at West Point, in 1876, was one, Johnson C. Whittaker,
a colored boy from Charleston, South Carolina. The boy was
extremely light in color and it seered as though the "color
prejudice" if it must exist at all, might in his case have
been exhibited in its mildest form. He enjoyed exactly the
same rights and privileges as his fellow cadets, and indeed
more, for in 1880, having failed in his examinations, instead
of being dropped from the academy, as is the usual rule, he
was merely placed in a lower class and permitted to remain.
At six o'clock on the morning of April 6, 1880, as Whit-
taker did not appear the Officer of the Day sent one of the
guard after him. His room was found to be in a state of cha-
os. Whittaker lay on the floor in his night-clothing, his
head upon a pillow, his feet bound loosely to his bed and his
hands tied, but not sufficiently tightly to preclude his free-
ing himsef, an Imdian club stained with blood lay near the
bed. Whittaker, when released, appeared to be severely fright
ened, he talked incoherently and seemed to be suffering in-
tense pain-
Whittaker' s story :as as follows--"Last night, imn'edi-
ately after tattoo I went to bed and I think I had been asleep
sometime, when I was awakened by the moving of the latch on
24
the door. I listened for a moment and then fell into a doze,
when I was suddenly awakened by somebod.y jumping on me. I
looked sharp amd there were three men in all. Two of them
wore dark clothes and the third had on a light gray suit and
all wore black masks. I drew back my arm to strike the man
who had jumped on me and I partly arose in the bed. Then I
was seized by the throat and choked until I was almost suffoca
ted. I was also struck a heavy blow on the left temple and
also on the nose, with something hard, the man who dealti the
blow shouting to me 'If you don't be still you will be a dead
man. Don't you holler ''. I was overpowered. One of the men
then said 'Let's mark him like they do the hogs down south;'
and then rwith what I think was a knife they cut off the lower
end of my left ear and slit the lobe of my right ear once or
twice. Next they began to tie my feet and I kicked as hard
as I could , when one exclaimed; 'Don't You kick or I'll cut
you!' and he. did stick my feet twice. At this tim the
small man in gray said to one of the others; 'Look out! don't
hurt him; see how he bleeds; t ake my handkerchief and put it
around his wounds' and they did but afterwards took it sway.
They .then tiled my feet and my hands with str ips of white cross
belts and laid me on the floor ti, th my feet towards the bed
and my head towards the wall.
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Next they tied my feet to the iron bedstead. I asked them if
they would'nt put a pillow under my head and they did. Again
they told me not to holler, and one said, 'Now let's leave'
After they left I tried to gnaw the straps from my hands e I
cried, but not very loud, and got no answer. I did not dare
to shout loud for fear of more harip. I think I must have laid
there three or four hours before revetLle, and was in a stupor
from blows received. I dont know who could have done this
thing. I didn't know I had an enemy. I think I could rec-
gnize at least one of the men by his clothing. T tried to
pull his mask off but he 4umped back. About a year ago I got
a note on which was written 'look outs. I don't know where it
came-,from. Last Sunday I found a sea)ed envelope in my room
and on opening it found this note insi'des."
Sunday April 4th.
Mr. Whittaker. You will be 'fixed'. Better keep
awake.
A friend."
The slits in Whittaker's ears which are referred to(ante)
were very slight and it was the opinion of those who examined
him when first found, that he was not as unconscious as he
seemed, added to this examinations were near at hand and it
was, in all probability, Whittaker's last chance of remaining
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at the Academy. From these and otlher f cts it was undeniably
the gener.l opinion among the West Point authorities that
Whittaker had conmnitted the as sault upon himself.
Now let us consider the testimony of the experts I-Aen thi
case came before a military court for investigation. It
will be clear , from the statenent of f.cts, that the field
bf investigation was narrow and that the case hinged upon the
discovery of the author of the anonymous note of warning. The
perpetrators of the outrage- if we believe Whittaker 's sto-
ry -must have been cadets at the Military Academy, once dis-
cover the author of the note and the mystery will be solved,
But if, on the other hand, Whittaker had comitted the as-
sault upon himself, then he certainly penned the note of warn-
ing, and the latter fact once established would prove the for-
mer.
The case, from the scientific standpoint, was full of
surprises. In the first place there was practical unantmity
of opinion among the experts called, a fact, which in the sci-
entific examiation of writing, is, unfortunately, very rare-
ly the case.
The following method of examination w~s practised by the
experts called into the. case. A specimen of writing contain-
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ing the words of the note of warning was obtained from every
cadet at 'he academy. These were submitted to the experts
without he names of the various authors being attached, In
addit ion was submitt ed -
1. An unfinished letter, written by Whittaker to his
mother, found in a drxwer in his table, when his room was tak-
en possession of by the authorities.
2. A requisition for postage stamps signed by Whittaker
and written upon a piece of paper shaped like the letter L.
3. A portion of an incompleted story, written by Whitta-
ker, and found in the drawer of the table before mentioned.
4. A piece of paper containing a few lines written by
Whittaker and identified by the Recorder of the court, Lieu-
tenant Sears, having written upon them "C. B. S. West Point,
N. Ye, April 12, 1880."
Before proceeding 1t would be well to note, that in this
case the experts were submitted to detailed preliminary exami-
nation before being permitted to testify. These examinations
were as varied, searching and conclusive as possible.
On the first test of the papers submitted to the experts
it was agreed by four of ithem th.at every paper written by Whit
taker displayed the sane ca ligr~phic charecteristics as the
28
"note of warning". One expert, Mr. Paine, agreed with the
other experts except as to the paper marked "C. B. S. West
Point, New York, April 12, 1880," and m he did not believe
that the author of the anonymous note could write as easily
and as gracefully as the writer of this fragment, he disagreed
as to this paper with the other experts.
A more searching tost was insisted upon by Whittaker's
friends and the following papers were submitted to three of
the expe ts.
Set 1.- was nade up of papers written by Whittaker him-
self and included the port ion of the story- the unfinish-
ed letter to his mother- the requisition for postage, and
other papers, none of which had previously been examined by
tb-jese experts.
Set 2.- included a miscellaneous collection of letters
and writings by officers, cadets and others collected at ran-
dom.
The question submitted to the experts were--
1. Whether the two sets of papers were written by the
sane person?
2. If not, which bore the most resemblance to the note
of warning.
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3. If any similarities were found, were they sufficient
to warrant the statemnt that their auth-or was also the au-
thor of the note of warning.
The experts, in the answers submitted, agreed that the
author of set I .Wrote the note of warning. Unusual as was
this exact agreement of the experts, there was still a greater
surprise to be presented to the court. A supplemental report
was received from one of the experts, Mr. Southworth, on the
last days of The trial stating that the paper used for the
note of warning, for the requisition, and upon which the un-
finished letter was written, had originally been one whole
sheet. The accompanying diagram will explain the ma31er in
which the division was iade.
This fact has bee n very mush assailed by various writers
who claim, as a rule, that it is not always possible to fit
paper together that has been torn, this statement is too deep-
ly within the realm of scientific uncertainty for discussion
here, suffice it that even were Mr. Southworth's discovery
fallacious, the testimony of the experts in this case was suf-
ficiently convincinig witxout it.
It would not be fitting to close the discussion of this
C~use Ce~l~bre without some mention of the rermrkable piece of
testimony in this case for which Mvr. Southworth is a lso re-
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responsible. According to this gentleman the"note of warning
when magnified, proved to be fiAntly covered with, what appear
ed to be specimens of half erased atte:nts at the style of
writing embodied finally in the note itself. This bit of
evidence(?) which has been to many an incontrovertible proof
of Whittaker's hyving been the author of Lthe note, seenrs to be
a statement well nigh incredible. In the first place, an at-
tempt at erasing would also remove the line from the paler,
this was not the case in the nole of warning, and in the sec-
ond place the discovery of the paper bearing an attempt at
this microscopic kind of prcatising would seem to be absolute-
I
ly wotthless as a subject of comparison with the disguised'
hand-writing in he note. It would seem to be almost impossI
ble to make an exact enlargement of a microscopic disguised
handwriting.
JIt may be that Whittaker did not write himself this fa.*,
mous note of warning, but it seems to be certain that the pa-
per upon which it was written was some which was exclusively
in his possession,^according to the testimony of five expertstf
corresponded in more particulars to the specimens of Whitta-
ker's handwriting submitted to them, than to those of any oth-
er cadet in the Academy, some ne of whom, must clearly have
been its author.
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THE MEDICAL EXPERT.
0-
There is probably no branch of expert testimony so comnonI
as that represented by the medical expert. In pojnt. of time
one of the first witnesses that was permitted to givn testimo-
ny that was mere opinion and no-. based upon actual facts, its
appearance has been growing more and more frequent until to-
day scarcely a criminal trial of a3ny importance is conducted
wi lhout the presence of-one or more experts skilled in the v3-
rious branches of Mediccl science. It is useless to regard
this species of testimony with contempt, to impress upon ju-
ries that , because of the divergence of opinions evidenced
by the experts called, the entire systen is worthless, or, at
its best, of little vL.lue.
The practise of admitting media&l expert testimony has
practically grown up with the common law and like the latter
has varied with the time and customs of the country. As to
the admission of the testimony of medical experts, Mr. Whar-
ton (I. Wharton's Ev. Sec. 441) says, "So jurisprudence does
not say to a surgeon or physician c -~lled to testify whether a
wound or a poison was fatal, 'you must have a particular diplo-
ma or belong to a particular professional school'; u tsy
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'If you have become familiar with such laws of your profession
as bear upon this issue, then you can testify how the issue
is affected by such laws'."
Livingston's Case, 14 Grat. 592.
New Orleans Code v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242
This familiarity may be gained from study rather than
from practise.
Fordyce v. Moore, 22 S. W. 235.
Thou'gh it is clear that the knowledge is equally valuable if
acquired from practise nerely or from both practise and partie
ular study.
It must depend upon the particular state of factoas to
whether the t -stimony of a physician is admissible
Graves v. City of Battle Creek, 54 ,. W. 77.
Wabash Ry. Code v. Friedrrnn, 41 111. App. 270.
Among the mny cases wklere the testimony of the medical
expert is admissible are - the nature and effects of a dis-
eas e.
In re Vananken, 10 N. Jo Eq. 18('.
The likelihood that a certain disease would produce death.
State v. Smith, 32 Me 39
Mathson v. Ry. Co., 35 NJ. Y. 487.
A surgeon nay be permitted to prove the nature of a wound and
its probable causes and effects.
Rumsey v. People, 19 II. Y. 41.
Commx. v. Piper, 120 Mass. 186.
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and in many other cases too numerous to rrnt ion. It is to be
noted that in no case is a witness permitted to usurp ,the
functions of the jury.
Rex v. Wright, Russ. & R. 456,
Sills v. Brown, 9 Car. & Payne, 601.
though a witnessmay be asked his opinion upon a similar state
of facts , hypothetically stated.
Sills v. Brown, (supra).
an ar'angen-ent that in many cases amounts to practically the
sane thing.
THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.
It is the usual rule that where an expert witness has no
actual knowledge of the faRcts in the case, that the statement
of facts already proved should be summed up in the form of
hypothetical zase and the witness asked what would be his pro.
fessional opinion on the subject matter of his testimony, if
such a st atement of fhcts were. actually true.
Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589.
Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9
Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392.
Fairchild v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. 398.
but if the facts upon whfich the ypothesis is based f~llrthan
the answer falls also.Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304.
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Nor can an expert be asked a hypothetical question upan facts
not proven in the case.
Muldowney v. Rye. Code, 39 Iowa, 615.
This, however, is not the rule in New York and in several oth-
er states. In those states the hypothetical question m.y be
based upon any possible pr probable range of the evidence in
the case.
Harnett v. Garvey, 6; N. Y. 641.
But, as a rule, it i nowhere necessary that the hypothetical
question should be based upon the exact reproduction of the
evidence, or an accurate presentation of what 'as beeln proved;
it will be sufficient if' it be in accordance with any reasona-
ble theory of the effect of the evidence.
Hall v. Rankin, 54 N. V. 217.
Baker v. State, 30 Fla., 41.
Where there is, however, absolutely no foundation in the case
for the facts assumed, the hypothetical question based upon
such facts is properly excluded.
People v. Harris, 136 N. Ye 423.
This hypothetical question, like almost every other ele-
ment that constitutes a part of expert testimony has been sub-
jected, at times, to the most severe criticism and perhaps
with some degree of justice. The wider the latitude permit-
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ted in propounding the question the result. That the admiss-
ion of this species of question is not without having certain
undeniable merits will be readily admitted, it must be acknowl
edged that it has, in addition, certain disadvantages.
Among the many minor questions involved in the discussion
of the testimony of experts and, more particularly, of medical
experts, is that of the rigrht to demand compensation for test'
fying. It is clearly inequitable to class such met with the
ordinary witness, the skill and labor which an expert is ex-
pected to employ involves an expenditure, of time, labor and
preparation not expected of the witness who testifies to facts
alone. There can be no doubt that, if the case be one of
public nature a witness might be compelled to give an opinion
as an expert without compensation. But as to the ordinary
class of cases the rule as laid down by Greenleaf on Evidence
(Sec. 310 n.) prevails, that author says, and his statement is
supported by the weight of authority, there is a distinc-
tion between a witness to facts, and a witness selected by a
party to give his opinion on a subject with which he is pecul-
iarly conversant from his employment in life. The former is
bound as a matter of public duty f'o testify as to facts with-
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in his knowledge, the latter is under no such obligation; 
and
the party who selects him must pay him for his time before 
he
will be compelled to testify".
People v. Montgomery , 13 Abb. Pr. . . 207.
LeMere v. McHale, 30 Minn. 410.
This rule also prevails in England,
Parkinson v. Atkinson, 31 L.J. C. P. N.'. 199
Turner v. Turner, 5 Jurist, ".,S.o839.
But the rule is bV no means universal in the United States.
In some states, as for example Rhode Island (Stat. 1882, p.
733, Sec. 15) and Iowa (40 Iowa, 646) the compensation of ex-
perts is provided for by statute, while in Indiana (Rev. Stats
1894, p. 175, Sec. 512) an expert may be compelled to testify
without extra compensation.
Another question that is of no small impobtance arises as
to the admission of scientific tiadises and writings as evi-
dence. It will be at once clear that books upon scientific
subjects that yearly expand and become developed should not be
admitted to prove the facts they set forth.
Washburn v. Cuddihy, 8 Gray, 430.
Comm. v. Brown, 121 Mass. 9.
Huffman v. Click, 77 N. C. 55.
This is otherwise in Iowa by statute (3,5 Iowa, 429) And the
contrary practise prevails in several other states.
Bowman v. Wood, 1 Ind. 441.
Boyle v. State, 57 Wis. 472.
Tucker v. McDonald, 60 Miss. 460.
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It is true that an expert witness may cite authorities to show
that the general consensus of opinion in his profession agrees
with h.s testimony and may even refresh his memory by turning
to standard authors in the domain of his specialty.
Pierson v. Hoag, 47 Barb. 243.
Harvey v. State, 40 Ind. 516.
But witnesses may never read extracts from such worksas prima-
ry proof in their departments.
Washburn v. Cuddihy, 8 Gray, 98 .
Comm. v. Sturtevant, ll Mass, 122.
Where a scientific witness has cited authorities to sustain
his position it is generally permitted to put such works in
evidence to discredit and contradict him.
Punny v. Cahill, 48 Mich. 584.
This is permitted in California under the Code
Galagher v. R. R. Co., 67 Cal. 13.
THE LEGAL EXPERT
The courtotthe place of trial will not, of itself, take
cognizance o~v laws. These must be offered and proved in ev-
idence, anid, though this may, as a rule, be accomplished by
offering statutes under the seal of the foreign sovereign, or,
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as is customary in the United States, by presenting the st.t-
ute laws of such foreign state in such a form as they are of-
ficially issued by thal. state;
Pease v. Peck, 18 How. (U.S) 595.
Mullen v. Morris, 2 Pa. St. 85.
Stewart v. Swanzy, 23 Miss. 502.
Pac. Gas Co. v. Wheelock, 85 N. Y. 278.
Wilt v. Cutler, 38 Mich. 189.
The Matter in these two last states, being provided
for by statutes; nevertheless, it is the more gereral custom
to prove foreign laws, whenever possible, by the testimony of
experts.
Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch. 187.
Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. (U.S) 400.
Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 36.
Pierce v. Insedth, 106 U. S. 546.
People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349.
But a certificate of a foreign expert will never suffice. The
witness himself must be examined under oath.
Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. (U.S.) 400.
In all other relations of their profession the testimony of
lawyers, not necessarily experts, is admissible, as , for ex-
ample, as to the Iractise of the courts.
Mowry v. Chase, 100 Mass. 79.
But in order to render a witness competent to testify as to
foreign law he must be either a professional man, or, at least
hold some official situation which presupposes the knowledge
of the laws of the c oun. try, as to which he is called upon to
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give an expert's testimony.
Sussex Peer; II Cl. & Fin. 134.
This rule has been broadened in the United States, to include
such persons, wiho , fr!ri the nature of their business, are
likely to ba acquainted with the laws of the foreign country
in que st io n.
Am. Life Ins. Co. v Rosenagle, 77 Pa. St. 507.
But the rule does not extend so as to include such persons as
have derived their knowledge of ,he law in question from a
mere course of study.
Bristow v. Sequeville, 9 Exch. 275.
A very broad rule prevails in New Hampshire and one not with-
out a great deal of merit. In that state the court has laid
it down as a rule that anV person who appears to the court to
be well informed as to foreign laws may give expert evidence
thereon whetlher he be a professi onal h wyer or not.
Hall v. Costello, 48 N. H. 176.
It is, however, better to increase the qualifications
necessary to admit a witness a s an expert in the many broad
fields of the law of foreign states and countries, rather than
to decrease them. Since the court is presumed to be unac-
quainted with the subject in discussion it might prove rather
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a difficult task to discover whether the witness offered as an
expert kpon such an important topic were possessed of any
higher legal attainments than an ability to convince the court
that he was well informred. Where it becomes necessary to ad-
mit. such testimony, it will be readily seen tha? its accuracy
is all important, it were better then, by increasing the nec-
essary qualifications, to reduce the rtuvber of those fitted to
present this kind of testimony and so insure a greater accura-
cy.
EXPERTS IN THE MECHANICAL SCIENCES,TRADES ETC.
It is never necessary, to constitute a man an expert,
that he should necessarily follow the trade, art, or profess-
ion relative to which his testimony is adduced, his competency
or incompetency hinqeb alone upon the extent of his knowledge
of such particnlar topic. So any person, familiar with a
trade nay testify as to the m-aning of perticular words or
phrases used in such trade.
Evans v. Comn. Ins. Co., 6 R. 1. 47.
There are no rules particular to these minor branches of ex-
pert testimony. Whe main qtestions being, in such cases--
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"Is this case one in which expert testimony ma: properly be
introduced?" orthat being answered,"Is the witness an ex-
pert within ihe meaning of the term?" That being decided it
then 1e<omes necessary to examine several of the more impor-
tant heads under which these questions or either of them,
have been raised.
Architest.---After a wwtness has testified to facts showing
that he has some knowledge of the cost or value of buildings,
acquired as a dealer, builder or architest, his testimony as
to the value of a building is competent.
Woodruff v. Imp. Fire Ins. Co., 80 Ill. 493.
Lut it is never allowable to admit the testimony of -n experV
no matter how well qualified, to prove the existence of a cus-
tom or usage merely.
Wilson v. Bauman, (83 N. Y. 133.
Since a custom to be recognized in the law, must be sufficien.
ly well known as to require no such proof.
Mechanics.- A machinist is always cormpetent to give an opin-
ion as an expert in relation to the construction of machinery.
Sheldon v. Booth , 50 Iowa, 209.
And he may even give evidence that a machine was not construct
ed in a workmanlike manner without specifying the particulars
42
particulars in which the machine was defective.
Curtis v. Gano, 26 N. Y. 426.
Insurance Experts. If we leave out of consideration the
Professions, there are few branches of the subject of expert
testimony tlat are of more importance than that/represented
by the Insurance expert. Probably one of the most familiar,
as well as one of the most important cases under this K-ead is
that of the Milwaukee & St.Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellog (94 U. S.
469). In this case an exception was taken because of the re-
fusal of the lower court to prmit the defendant to show by
witnesses who were experts in the business of fire insurance,
that, owing to the distance between a mill and a pile of lum-
ber, the mill would not, in case of fire insurance, be consid-
ered in measuring the hazard of the lumber, or vice versa.
Mr Justice Strong, delivering the opinion of the court, said-
"This exception is quite unsustainable. The subject of the
proposed inquiry was a matter of common observation, upon whih
which the lay or an educated mind is capable of forming a
judgment. In regard to such matters experts are not permitted
to speak their conclusions. In questions of science their o-
pinions are received, for in such questions scientific men h
have superior knowledge, and generally think alike". But, in
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an action upon a policy of fire insurance providing against
any increase of risk, the testimony of experts is competent
upon the question as to the materiality of circumstances af-
fecting the risk, especially where its determination calls for
a degree of knowledge not likely to be possessed by an Qrdina-
ry jury.
Corning v. Farm B2l!d.s. Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 295.
In order, however, to make the testimony of an expert compe-
tent, it must be based upon facts and not upon mere conject-
ure, he is not, however, necessarily confined to his own obsea
vation but may give testimony upon a hypothetical statement of
facts presented to him while upon the witness stand.
Higbie v. Guardian etc. Life Ins. Co. 53 N. Yo 603.
Railrod Exrerts - Another class of cases in which ihe tes-
timony of the expert is frequently a necessity, are those a-
rising from railroad accidents, and in such cases, where the
question involved is one requiring some peculiar knowledge of
mechanics beyond that acquired by the average layman, the ex-
pert skileed in such lines is alone qualified to speak.
Penna. Co. v. Conlan, 101 Ill. 93.
Thua it is conetent to show by an experienced engineer the
rate of speed that is usually considered safe when an engine
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is running backward.
Cooper v. Cen'tral Ry. of Iowa, 44 Iowa, 135.
And a person who has acted continuously for more than seven
years as a railroad conductor has been permitted to give ex-
pert evidence )s to the mans of stopping railoal trains.
Montgomery R. R. Co. v. Blakely, 59 Ala. 471.
Patent Experts. Here, too, we find displayed the animosity
that all too frequently marks the admission of the testimony
of the expert. ,In re Taggart, (Corm. Dec. 1869, p. 103) it is
said "Good-experts are especially valubble for the skill with
which they -assist their client and badger, befog, and bewilde
the enemy. No wise judge would dare to put his trust implic-
it ly in such witnesses; and, very frequently, uhe care which
is necessary to unravel their sophistries, and avoid the in-
fluence of their obvious bias, would be much more pfofitably
employed in an examination of the case without their aid."
The rule as to "who is an expert" is, in this class of
cases, very clearly defined. The Patent Act contemplates two
classes of persons as peculiarly appropriate witnesses.
i. The practical mechanic to determine the sufficiency of
the specifications as to the mode of constructing, compounding
and using the patent.
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2. Scientific and theoretic mechanics to deter;,ine wheth-
er the patented article is subst-,ntially new in its structure
and mode of operation, or simply a mere change of wquivalents,
and this class Mr. Justice Story considers "The most importAnt
and most useful to guide the judgment, and to enable the jur,
to draw a safe conclusion, whether the modes of operation were
new or old, were identical or the reverse."
Allen v. Blunt, 3 Story, 742.
It must, however, He no ted, and this fect is comnon to al
classes of cases where it is so'iht to introduce the testimo-
ny of an expert, that the court cannot be compelled to receive
an expert's testimony.
Winans v, N. Y. & Erie Co., 21 TOW. S.
As to the weight an expert's testimony is entitled to, the
rule here is the same as in every other class of this kind of
evidence. The knowledge of the witness, his fairness, the q-
bility he evinces, his peculair advantages for observation,
study and research must ?ll be weighed nd con idered, i x _
on them the value of his testimony in a court of law must rest
Johnson v. Root, 1 Fisher, 351.
Morris, v. Barrett, I Fisher, 461.
The necessity for the admission of the testimony of a n expert
is one to be decided by the court in each particular instance.
Howard v. City of Providence, 6 R. 1. 516.
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No rule can be authoratatively laid down to cov,-lr every case.
The questions concerning wxpert testimony are of ,rowing
importance, little by little the necessit.> for it- introduc-
tion has increased, step by step it has grown and developed,
unLil, today, when scarcely a murder trial of note comes be-
fore our tribunals without bringing in its train a small army
of experts, representing the one side or the other, it has be
come impossible to listen, for the weeks that this kind of tea
timony frequently and to pass it all by as "Of little
value", or "entitled to but little weight"
It is much to be regretted that this kind of testimony
should prove, in many cases, so entirely contradictory, and
yet the imatter is not irremediable. In his monograph upon
experts and exrert testimony -Mr. Moak says- "As to a rem-
edy in a case where expert testimony is admissible, I can see
none, except for counsel, and for the court to inform them-
selves as fully ,as possible upon the sbject so as to be able
to detect and to expose, a false or a fallacious statement or
conclusion;---and this is indeed the best, and the only remedy.
Such preparation would sift down the number' of supposed ex-
perts who, fearful of an exposure in open court, would hesi-
tate to take the. stand; whereas the true expert , confident in
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his own knowledge and skill, would take the severe test of the
Witness Stand as , mere increase of his own reputation and+th y
doubly enh-nce his value as an expert witness.
aINDEX OF CASES CITED.
Allen v. Blunt ........3 Story, 742
Brestow v. Sequeville .... 9 Ex. 275
Baker v. State................30 Fla. 41
Boyle v. State,................57 Wis. 472
Bowman v. Wood 1 Ind. 44
Beard v. Kirk1..............1 N. H. 397
Concord Ry. v. Greely, 23 N. H.237-43
Clark v. Burch,............. 12 Hun, 271
Caleb v. State,. ........... 39 Wis. 721
Corning v. Burden,.15 Howard,270
Commonwealth v. Piper, .... 120 Mass. 186
v. Brown,......121 " 9
v. Sturtevant..117 " 122
Church v. Hubbart,.2 Cranch187
Curtis v. Gano ............ 26 N. Y. 426
Corning v. Farm Bldg. Ins. Co.74 N.Y. 295
Cooper v. Central Ry.......44 Iowa, 135
Dexter v. Hall, ........... 15 Wall. 9
Dellafield v. Parish,.........25 N. Y. 9
Ennis v. Smith,............. 14 Hot. 400
Ely v. James,..........123 Mass. 36
bEvans v. Commercial Ins. Co., ..... 6 R. I. 47
Fairshield v. Bascom, 35 Vt3........35 Vt. 398
Fordyce v Moore,...............22 S. W. 235
Folkes v. Chadd, .............
Gay v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co.
Graves v. City of Battle Creek,
Galagher v. Ry. Co.,..........
Highie v. Guardian &c. Ry. Co.,
Hall v. Costello, .
Harvey v. State, ...........
f
Huffnmanv. Click, .........
Hall v. Rankin,
Harritt v. Garvey...............
Hovey u. Chase.................
Heald v. Thing,
Howard v. City of Providence,
In re Van Anken,..........
" " Taggart, ..... 0Com. De
Johnson v. Root,
Jones v. Luck,
Kennedy v. People,...........
LeMere v. McHale,............
Livingston's Case,
3 Doug.157
.. 9 Blatch.143
54 N.W. 757
a* 67 Cal. 13
.53 N. Y. 603
48 N.H. 176
40 Ind. 516
77 N. C. 55
54. N. . 217
..6 N. Y. 641
.52 Me. 304
45 Me.
6 R. I.
10 N. J. Eq.
c. (1869),
... 1 Fisher,
**041 N.H.
0 39 N.Y. 255
.30 Minn.
14 Grat.
392
516
186
103
351
546
-57
410
592
0 0 0 *
Marshall v. Ins. Co.,.......... 27 N.He 157
Mason v. Fuller,................... 45 V* 29
Mattison v. Ry. Co., .. ..... 35 N. Yo 487
Mullen v. Morris,................ 2 Pa.St.85
. . . . .1 0 0 M a s s 7 9
Mowry v. Chese,. ....... ...... .
Milwaukee &c. Ry. Co. v. Kellog, 94 U. S. 469
Montgomery Ry. Co. v. Blakely, ... 59 Ala.471
Morris v. Barrett,.I Fisher,461
Muldowny v. Ry. Co.,.39 Iowa,615
New Orleans Co.v. Britton,.....38 S8. 242
People v. Lambert, .......... 5 Mich. 349
Pierce v. Insedth,...............106 U. . 546
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Wheelock, .... 80 N. Yo 278
Pease v. Peck,............. ...... 18 How. 595
Punny v. Cahill'..48 Mich.584
Pierson v. Hoag,.47 Barb.243
Parkinson v. Atkinson, 31 L. J. C. R.N.S. 199
People v. Montgomery, .13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 207
People v. Harn,.................136 N. Y. 423
Perkins v. Stickney,.............132 Mass. 217
Peterborough v. Jaffeey, ...... 6 N. H. 462
People v. Buchanan,.Trial Report
People v. Guiteau,.Trial Report
Rochester v. Chester,
Rumsey v. PeopleI...
Rex. v. Wright,.....
Robinson v. Robinson,
Robertson v. Stark,
Sheldon v. Booth, ...
* 3 N. H. 349
19 N. Yo 41
Russ. & R..456
.64 N. Y. 589
.15 N. H. 109
... .50 Iowa, 209
Suasex v. Peer, ............... 11i CI.& Fin.134
Stewart v. Swanzy,............... 23 Miss.502
Snyder v. Iowa City,...............40 Iowa,646
Sills v. Brown,..................9 C. & P. 601
State v. Smith, 32 Me0. ..... 32 Me. 329
Staarine &c. Co. v. Heitzman, 17 C.B. N.S. 56
Shelton v. State,. ................ 34 Tex.663
Tailor v. Railway,................ 48 N. H. 304
Turner v. Turner,............5 Jur. N. . 839
Tucker v. M cDonald,.................60 Miss. 460
VanZandt v. Life Ins. Co.,........55 N. Y. 169
VanGuysling v. VanKuren,.........35 N. Y. 70
Whipple v. WIpole,a...............10 N. H. 130
Winans v. N.Y. & E. Ry. Co., . .21 How. 88
Wabash Ry. Co. v. Friedman, 41 Ill. App. 270
Woodbury v. O'Brien,.7 Gray, 467
Washburn v. Cuddi1y,- . . 8 Gray, 430
dI
Witt v. Cutler,...................38Mich.189
Woodruff v. Imperial Ins. Co., 80 Il. 493.
Wilson v. Baumann,........ ... 83 N. Y. 133
Year Books,...................... 7 Hen. 6,11
9 Hen. 7,16
